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Answer FOUR questions. Question 1 is COMPULSORY. Choose THREE (3)
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(b)
Ouestion 1 (COMPULSORY) (40 marks)
Refer to the CASE: Lenovo in 2005
(a)
(c)
(e)
Based on specific intemational business theory, what makes Lenovo acquire IBM's
PC Division?
[ 8 marks ]
Do you agree that Lenovo stop using IBM brand name Thinkpad and concentrate on
Lenovo? Why?
[ 5 marks ]
Yang Yuanqing is PC business unit general manager. His responsibility is to look
after purchasing, manufacturing and marketing of all PC products. Is his decision to
eliminate direct sales and switch entirely to distributor sales the best choice? Why?
[ 8 marks ]
Global expansion offers Lenovo the opportunity to generate greater profits than
companies that focus strictly on the domestic market. Would Lenovo be able to
compete globally? V/hy?
[ 5 marks ]
Explain how Lenovo would be able to ensure that the company work closely with the
Chinese goverffnent and maintain a strong competitive position in the United States.
[ 8 marks ]
"The IBM brand brings reputation to Lenovo. It removes a barrier to Lenovo's
products-particularly outside of China. Lenovo now seems more reliable, more
trustworthy. Even to customers who are fully aware that the product is no longer
"made" by IBM, a stamp of approval from such a highly respected company means a
lot in any market." Explain this statement in light of other competitors.
(d)
(D
[ 6 marks ]
Ouestion 2 (20 marks)
The world's poorest countries are at a competitive disadvantage in every sector of their
economies. They have liule to export. They have no capital; their land is of poor quality;
they often have too many people with the given available work opportunities; and they are
poorly educated. Free trade cannot possibly be in the interest of such nations! Discuss and
provide examples.
[ 20 marks J
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Ouestion 3 (20 marks)
Theories of international trade are important to an individual business firm primarily because
they can help the firm decide where to locate its various production activities. Using Porter's
theory of national competitive advantage, suggest how Proton can penetrate Indonesian
market.
[ 20 marks ]
Ouestion 4 (20 marks)
(a) Foreign direct investment (FDD has grown more rapidly than world trade and world
output. Most FDIs have been directed at the developed nations, and the United States,
Japan, and the European Union have often been the favourite target for the FDI
outflows. In 1990, some 47 percent of oufward FDI stocks were in service industries.
Discuss the shift in FDI from manufacturing to services. What is driving the trend?
[ 10 marks ]
You are assigned to evaluate an investment in an automotive company in India.
Explain the direction of such FDI either vertical or horizontal FDI, and the strategic
behaviour you need to consider.
[ 10 marks ]
Question 5 (20 marks)
(b)
(a)
(b)
You are approached by Starbucks to invest in the market that has not been tapped.
You have suggested that Starbucks should invest in developing countries. However,
Starbucks has its own belief about investing in other countries. "starbucks has a
strong commitment to coffee producers, their families and communities, and the
natural environment to help promote a sustainable social, ecological, and economic
model for the production and trade of coffee. Discuss the notion of social
responsibility that you need to take into consideration. What does it mean for
corporations?
[ 10 marks ]
Discuss the cultural relativism approach to business ethics. What is tho connection
between this approach and the phrase when in Rome do as the Romans? How well
does this approach hold up ethically?
[ 10 marks ]
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Ouestio4 6 (20 marks)
The choice of mode of entering a foreign market is a major issue with which international
business must wrestle. Another major issue is the timing of entry when the firm first enters to
a foreign market while others are not doing so. Explain the relationships between first mover
disadvantages and pioneering costs. Provide example from the apparel industry such as
Dockers, Calvin Klein or Ralph Lauren into Malaysian market.
[ 20 marks ]
Ouestion 7 (20 marks)
(a) Discuss the implications of cultural differences between countries for marketing
strategy. Provide examples in consumer products.
[ 10 marks ]
(b) How do levels of economic development affect consumer behavior? What are the
implications for marketing strategy?
[ 10 marks ]
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r?he survey was called Global Informedon Technology 100.
mobile phone handsets. l,enovo also provided manufac-
nrring€rd IT integration and supporr services.
: In 2004, Lenovo recorded salis of $Z,g7l.Z million
and a net income of $135 millian and controlled about
2.2 per-cent ojthe global pC marker and, in ZOO3, 27 pev
cent of the C1rinese PC marlcet. In February ZOOO,Leg.
end. wa:.ranked eighth in .a survey 
"onaoct.a 6yBusircssWebl(:r. The folowing y.ar, kgend was voted as
Asia's Best Managed Cornpaiy io a -r#"y 
"oar"ted byFinance Asia.
in2oo5 m
INTRODUCTION
l^T:"o,forurerlyknown I Legend, was the largestper-
H, to*plter (PC) make5 in chha. Legeni Grouptrotclrngs, which was controlled by the Chinese gov€np
ment, owned a majority stake in Lenovo, which-offered
various 
_ 
products including low-priced compurers,
servers, handheld computerq i*"gi"g equipment, and
Copyright@ 2@5 ICFAI Knowledge Gn4r, Hyderabad, India. ThisF* y* qfp"d by Anrn Khsn dftr th".d-i;d". JVuip"i"*"..Kcprinted by permission of ICFAI Kno"t"ds;e;;jiifaf U"r"*irr.
...6t-
,. On Deceurber 7rZCfy', Lenovo annourrced rhat it
'$mrld acquire IBM'sPC Division (whichhas 15'5 get--
I"I'iof"dt market fiare) for appro<irnatelv $1'75 bil-
:il;. io become the world's thinl targest PC maker withi;r":*l ot"rbf close.to ${2 bitlion" After a 45-day rcview
;,h" Coonittee on Foreign Ilrvestm€rit in the United
-Sti* 
tCfruS), the deal was given a grem 
-siqgl by 
the
US. too.ttt*unt and CFIUS on Mmdr 9, 2005'
-'VE 
ta .ttu a.a really take Lenovo and IBM to great
heislru? Could Lenovo become aglobalplayer and intq'
erale'IBM's U.S. operations? Would lxr:rovo be able to
ituiD"BI\,{tPC custome*? These were the quEtions an'
alysts pond6red as 2005 got under way.'
BACKGROI'ND
The EarlY DaYs
Itr 1984, Liu Chuanz.hl I comPuter sclentist who be'
*" * adsrinistrative manigel in the Cogqr{ing.Ie
it*." of the Chinese A.ad"*y of Scienctl (CAS) in
Fijing, was given a' mandate end. $24'000 to start a
corDoany to commercialize the instinrte's,tFsearch re-
zultr in order to fimd its o'ngoing. research costs' Liu,
along with 10 colleagues, fomed the New Technologf
DevJlopment Company, NTD). Thev started opera'
tiors in a small br:ngalow g,ven b QAS free of cost"
D:ring,the frst trro years, NTD aciedasa middlernan"
".q.tirit 
g products ftbm' hrge domestic distributors and
sdling Oin to govemf,rent ageneies and large etate-
owued enterprises (SOEr).
To overcome Aeii initiat firnding corutraints, fiey
even tried selling television sets and electronic
qratches. At the time, as Cfiina had limited domestic
iC r"t uf""tr:ring capabilities, almost 
"lt 
thS PGs wbre
imported. In add'ition to foftign ur{ucts-'impor9d
A-Wn formal c.hannels, 4any pryducq wete also
t.trggl"d into Chir:a through graYchannels' Since no
trtif-*tt paid og gray rnart* product, ttrey cotl|d-be
sold at rnuch loweipq.ices'. A,t a rezult, many srnall dis-
uibuton bought thesl ptoduca and distributor proftt
magins fell steepty. I.ITE felt the significant price Prcs'
flre and realized-that the company needed its own
producu to survive in the long run 
. ^ 
-.
-- AI-*, all the opemting systens (OS) were hglish
and few Chinese qpole E"cfub, Recognizing the OS bot-'
tt*.d., Liu decided to tatt bis oum prodlct dwelop-
ment by tratrslatirrg anEnglish OS into Chinese' NTD
* oot alone ia ma*edng Chinese-langrragp solutions
ftrr PG. But in contrast to tirrl softtrare products,'NTDs '
sotutionwas hardware'based. NTD nsed anew pettem'
rccognition technology and developqd the Legend Ctri'
""*Esouo" Card 
(LCIC) in 1985, whic'h was desigued
{G* goo"*-e* i$tiurttoo h lliiine.
[AGU6l0l
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to be irserted into PC motherboards. Unlike software so-
lutioru, Legend's cud did not occtrPy signiftcant
"r*unb of Jcetty trarddisk 
space. Duplicating 'the hald'
ware was also more difficulttbafl .cogy.ing <bmpating
software products. This was a signiftcant advanag-e-be-
cause industry e4erts estirote*tlat ryer'lulfof-al1-Mi-
crosoft DO-S systeos irualled on PG in the People'1
Repubtic ofChinawere pirited. An importaotfeanre of
this teclrnology was "associatiorr" or'T-ian Xiuid (kC'
end's Chinesi-nane). The association ftatrue enabled
thesyste,nr to promptChinese ctraracters which could be
used to forrr ergresio'ns andpbrases with the character
inpuc The dwllopment of the new product also con-
vinced a few e<perienced scientists in the Comptting In'
Etiilte of the compalr/s futrue Prospects and mticed
dren to jointhe sales and urarketing efforts. LCIC be-
carne a huge'.urccess within a year. NTD changed lts
rraue tolegeird in 1989.
BV bundling LCIC with the imported PCs' Legend's
distribution brsines atso made significant progress. In
1987, kgend s'igned a foniral agreem€n! to disuibute
AST PG and Hewlett Packsril (HP).peripheret pToa'
ucts. With FIP, kgend stafted h disa-iludng CAD sys'
tems and gradually €rrpanded into llPprinters and othet
p"riph*lproducts. Success in the dietdbution fqit"y
"11&"d 
feiend to accumulate caPial fc fr1u19 devel'
opment tntd t^e6"a a gmeration-d f9."g leaders gain
experienc€ in the marlceting and distrtbution side of the--
b,stness. Dring the 1980s, distribution itself accounted,
for mote than 60 percerrt of Legend's total reltenue'
' [n the late 1980s, the Chtnese govemment rcalized.
the need to bufi an indigenorrs PC industry. The Min'
istry of Electronic Indrstrib' (ME[) granted PC manu-
f"i"i"g licenses to a few ftrrns it dGidy owned. N-ot,
berng direcdy oqrned byMEI, Legen{-lpr ngt granted a
nanufacuuinglicense in China. Therefote, it dectded to
mrrrt'acture abroad. The company choe Hong Koug as
is base for operarions. In 1988, I*g.od established'a
joint verrture-with Dao Yuen3 and China Technologt
Ttansftr Company (CTTC), which was joindy owned by
the Bdnk.of Chin", China Resources, alrd two'other
w"11-"ot"""tud nainland frms
" Gmd began its ttong Kong opemtions wiih disni'
bfiiol tt utiliz"d Hmg Koads geographical advantage,
to'Deoetrate the growing Chinese market during the
fidOs. teg*d's rclatioruhip with AST{ was the most
zuccessful'example of this to"t gf. AST distributed its
products th*ugt sevqal Chlnese comganies,.includirrg I
Le*d, but erperienced difficulties ia communication'
ani .oordinationr vhile dealiag with nainland ftrms' Fq
!D.ao Yuan war a lfmg Ko'og Eading coBparry. 
-+;F;;U.S.;G& 
.""it rt* rnanufrcnier' In dre q|id-198&' A'ST
; ; *[o"f -*r PC nsntt'aaturcr *cll bchrnd hdustry leaders IBM
...7 l-eodHP.
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exarnple, AST had to uanslate nearly all corespondence
;.h il *titl*a Chinese distdbuEors' Many mainland
;;*ies tumed. off thqir fut maelrines after work
-ho*?rsut"ttabtislitrg-apreserrrtein:Hcrry:Kong Leg'
entHong Kong took ou"t dl contract negotiatiors and
i*p".U"fr* iaruactions with AST, while I*gend Be+
iid *tiJd out achnl distribution, sales and service in
i,,fJtrlana China. Since Legend had been in the distri'
botiott bt siness fqr seveml years by that time and its sales
io* h*d 
""",-tol"td corsiderable 
gxpedence ftom dis-
JiU",i"nfn IDM, and other foreign- vendols'products,
Legend #as instnrmenal to AST's success in penetrating
thJ Chiouse market" \[/ith Legmd's helP, AST became
*i" n*t U* one vendor of PC products in China by the
early 1990s, accounti$g for 293 petcent of total unit
shipments ir^Lggl,
Vrut" the trading and disribution bysiness grew
quickly and became very profitable, Legend Hong Kong
Jo"i-J"ud to look fot * ippoot*rity to enter mariufac-
turing. In late 19-88, it acquiretl Quanrtum Design Intet- '
*ioiot (QDI).5 Legend aggressively marketed QDI
motherboards ovErseas using a low-pricb strategy'
fu was not until the 1989 Vorld Fair held in Hanover,
G"t*rny, that Legend finatly caught the-attention of
the Chinese governm"nt- The Chinese delegation at
the fair corrsiited of senior officials from several min-
irt io tug.tl"ting *re trading and marrufacnuing of elec'
ttorri" pioa""tt-in China. After Legend demoruuated
its mariufactr:ring prowess at dre fah the MEI sent a sPe-
cial delegatiot io Hot g Kong to thoroughly i"lP!9t
Legend's-R&D and manufacturing capability' In 1990'
"frl Ugt was satisfied with the 
inspection, it granted
Legend a license to manufacture PG in China'
!y 1995, Legend had become the ftfih'largest maru'
fr"no, of 'moilerbouds in the world and one of the
three board manufactnrers performing beta tests on each
new generation of lntel CPUs (the other qyo wepThi'
**.i" companies, Acer and Gtg"byt")' The comp-any
lad ust"ttiitted more than 30 overseas sales oftices
thnough*t the world to market its motherboards'
Reorganlzation
In Lgg4, having resolved to be in PC manufacftring'
f.n*a b"a*"i.d a detailed analpis of its PC business
*'ia*tify areas that needed irnpro.'em"nt' One zudr
L" *rr, 
" 
misaligtt"d incentive struchue and uncoordi'
*i"d itt.*"t ieeision'malcing process' Legend's PC
brsiness was organized on firnctional lines, zuch as Pur'
chasing, manGcnsing, and mar-keting'F"h area u/as
dercrmined by its ability to meet frrnctional targes $etjn
rh" *ttu"l pt'aruring pio""*. To solve the problem' the
-7 -
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SQrantum Design International was a motherboard manufacturing
companyin Hong Kong.
manlagement decided to coruotidale a[ikgendll9:
rehti br.rsinesses lnto a new PC business r'rrit (PCBU)
bLL994.
-- fs,r.v was
"o*inla the'unjit's 
general manager' Yang had joined
f,i;;d i" 19s8. He had completed his master's degree in
.oirpur"t science from the Univemity of- Science and
f""tr"otogy. Most of the senior managecs ofthe company
*"." otdd'th"t, 50, and did not havc much err;nrience
i" totk"g in a market environmgnt, or in a rapidly
"ft^neitg 
FC i"a*or. On the o{e.1.$dr Yang hed
J.*Jtti"r.d his managemenc capabrlity in his fust few
y"*t 
"rrt Legend. 
He-also had mqe ftont-ttne opeta-
don management experience than most other young
managem..
-- 
-Ad"t taking over, Yrrg looked {9r prnchasing' man'
uf*"n rin!, ani marketing of all PC paoducts' He was
gi"."-tt Jt"edom to detJrmine aew-product launches,
lianoel selection, and pricing strategies based on market
"o"aiJo*. 
All the frrnctionalmanagers were evaluated
r" LA deparrmeltal and gU repulb' For enample' the
purchasing mtnager was enaluated on purchasing'
i.lated p#ormaoJe *etsrrtes, regardless of the accr:racy
oitar&"uttg forecasts provided Uv thi marketing man-
ager. Even if it.'mtory t-umover.wa-s slow due to inaccu'
iit" .*t", forecasts, the prnchasitg manager had to
take some responsibilitY.
-g.fot" 1994, Legend sold its PCs ttuough both a di-
rect sales force of more than 1@ sales rqnesentatives
*i t *at as of local 'distributors' Channel conflicts
*l* **V. L" first major marketing decision Yang tgok
r* ," 
"fii"tttate 
direct sales and swi'tch entirely to {is'
;ib"; t.hs. Legend was the fnstdosresuc manufac-
ilt;."U" Oit iecision Yang cut fie'sales force to 18
;;";b i,:st enough to manage a distributor network'
'--fhJ pcnu 
"Lo f**"d'on corttrolling costs 
and
uopiooittg *anufacturing-efficiency" Jo e,nsne timeiy
."fi..t1"i'of receivables, Legend requited all disaibu'
io" toi.i"fb to pay cCIh up-front' Credit Yas.cranted
onlv after the disributor eamed a good tracl( tecoto
;iri ,h" ;*parry. Legend alsb tied most of its dtstrib-
;;ir"""tils, such as price disconnts, quarterly re'
t"iii*a co'oP adverulinq feg, to 
"Th collectionlirro.y. This information helpg-d Legend-ryintain an
*ot-o t""eivable nrmover of less than 3O days' com-
p.rJt" the industry average of aound 90 days in
China.
--nt.fiti"C tbat prices wete faliing mpidly in the PC
market, Legend alio attempted co improve its inventory
;;;t rit Ae popubrltandard products' the com'
oanv maintained abundant levels of inventory to en-
I*"' tttip*"",'within one week' For less-p-oPll*
;;"G Legend adopted a built-to-order.model' Yang
?elr that since the national logistics and delivery sy-stem
;;;;d;a."eloped in China, a complete built'to'
...8/-
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order model would not wbrk, With dgfrtened control,
Legend managed to improve inventory tumovet to
seven times in 1995.
The reorganization quickly paid off' In 1994' the
sucond,quarierPC sales-went up by 152
-*p"r"i to the same period i\ \9?3 and the PCBU
r"d. 
" 
proftt Through ie channel developm-ent efforts
and impiovement in ma4agement efficiency, Legend was
su""oJful in increasing the PC sales and capturing
5.? percerrt of the market in 1995.
riltho"gtt Legend focused more on manufactr:ring its
o*, ULd"a Pd, its sepuate distribution hisiness con'
tinued t{gow' Legend's agreement with HP stretc'hed
into PC ptid,r"t 'rr.tgg4 and into serveT lnL995'Leg:
end becamb the unique distributor fot Toshiba laptops in
China. It also tt"tt d disti$uting PCs and related pe'
ripheral products for Apple, Sun, IBM, and Canon'
- 
By L996,kgend had increased its manufacturing ea'
pacity to ttoi*d 500,000 urin l yearr In addition, Leg'
utd *t" abte to reduce ovetheads to about 20 percent of
toral unit cost. The management decide{ ttiat by lower-
ing prices, Legend could inse:se its sales votrlne, which
#dd in'tur; lower r-rnit ovErhead costs and iiriprove
I*gend's entire cost struchre.
Lgendt maru€ement had noticed a mismatdr be'
t*e.tim"rket demand for the latest tec,hrologies and the
aew-product introduction strategies -of maiot- players'
Because of low cons"mptionlevels in Ctrina and the rel-
atively higlr prices due to tarifft and transporution costs,
foreign miltinationals launched PC products into China
aboui foruto ftve months after theyhavebeenlaunched
elsewhgre.
Whileilashing PC prices by 30 percent, Legend-also
becarne the first.to nr-arket new'techriologies' Early in
t99d, Iniel had lduriched its Pentium chip. In China,
howeveq the PC makem were still sellirg 4S6spriced at
bround $1,800, whidr induded a 15 percent tariff' Fol-
lowing a detailed analysis, I-egend noted that total ma-
terialiost, including tariff and transportation" for a
hentium-based'PC 
"'buU 
work out A $1;100. Failing
cornponerrit costs and potential lower unit overhead cose
,"r,rltitg from volume inc,reases meant that Legend
could bieak even or'even'make a small profit by selling
Pendum-basecl PCs at $1,200. Legend implemented this
strateef in March i996.
f"i"nat sales volume increased drastically, andso the
rrnit Jverhead costs fell to 16 percent of total cost' The
Eiobal componeflt costs also corrtinued to frll ar;rdL"g'
La t"a"".a the prices by 25-30 Percent sn its latest
models wice morl in 1996. By early 199?,Irgend sold
almost 140,OOO deskcop PCs, captrning the number one
position in China with a 9.4 percent share, slighth
ahead of IBM's 8.4 Percent
By 1999, Legend felt tlrat the ilatemet could pose a se-
rioris thseat to the way thattraditional business was con'
Lenoryinzo05 @ Gases
ducted in China. Raptdly growing Intemec portals and
business-to-blrsiness (B-to-B) €-coflIlr€t€€ start'qps were
attracting larrge venture capital frrnding and going pub-
lic. Even br:reaucratic govemment agencies rffet€ utov'
ing rrnling-.cpured hy-aiighly publicized campaign-.by
the Beijing govemmmt.
Fnrtirermore, potential conflicts of interdst between
Legend's own PC business and iu distribution business
b.iane increasirgly evident. Although its distribution
business had cornmanded 30 petcent anrrual gowth in
the past, it becane increasingly ddftcult to reduce its
costs while uing the traditional distribution model.
China's impending accession into the Vortd Tade Or'
ganization (\[/TO) was apt to increase domestic compe'
tition, threatming Legerrd's competitive position in the
domestic market
Legend's'm€nqgement realized that a signlffcant re'
thinking of the cofopany's business and organization was
cruclal ior futute success. Responding to the thrcat from
the Intenret and global competition witlin China, Leg-
end arurounced a major restructuring of its. organization
to take effect April 2@0. Legend Eloldirrgs wali restrrrc'
tured into two issentially indepeodent businesses with
full decision meking authorities: Legend Computing
System (LCS) and Digial China, LCS becacre reqponsi-
bie for ail of Legendt'computers' softqnare, and newll
formed lntemet businesses offering corurectivity and
content. Digital China took Legend's distribution busi'
ness into a B,to-B markeplace and developed its new
networki4g business.
During late 2000, Legend stepped up its efforts to caP'
true a significint share of the corporate.PC segnent. In
Novemder 2000, Legend launched two mqdels of com'
mercial.Internet PCs-Doctor of Brsiness 6000 and
Doctor of Net 200G-ta4eted at sm-all dtil inedium en'
terpdses (SMEs) in China. The models were designed to
melt the ofrce automation requiremenb of SMEs. The
compatry also larrnched Luna P4, China's frrst branded'
PC equip'peil wittr an Intel Pentium 4 procesor.
In'December 2000, Ggi"d larmched second'
generation Iaternet PC models called Conet II aDd
ib"g,i. Conet II was equipped with anAVworlstatioar,
whiJh alowed users toiecord videos. I;egend launched
four new models of home PG-Tlanhri for children' F'u-
ture Pioneet fgt high sdrool strldmts' Tianlufor adults'
and Tianle for middle'aged aad elderly Peopfe' The Fu-
ture Pioneer model was iquipPed widr a muldmedia and
a$*taudio system and a jD accelerated display card'
whi"h allowedsnrdents to play 3Dvideo games'b ZOQZ, Legend .nt"t"d the ioftrn'are coruultancy
br:siness. Ti," 
"i*p*y acquired a 51 percent stake inHan Consulting Limited6 to joindy offer IT consultancy
Gd^u orl".urr*runt consulting and IT servicei comlany in china"
...9/-
Part 5 @ *t Strategy and Sunrcnu'e of lrfi€mauonalBusiness
senrices to medium-sized and large enterprises in China.
fuing mid-2002, I*gend entered the mobile handset
brsiness tfuough a $150 rrillion, 60:40 joint venhrre
with Xiamesr Ov.etseas Chiqese Electrsnic C;ompany
Limited,T The tw6 companies ageed to integrate their
research andproductdevelopment effotts to develop and
market mobile handsets in China.
The domestic marketwhere Legend generated more
than 90 percent of its business was provlng increas-
ingly trids''i as local players such as Foirnder sharpened
theii attack. At the same time, price,cutting by inter'
nation/al rivals sudr as Dell and Toshiba was eroding
Legerid's share of the world's fastest growing PC
market
E ,p"nding into the intemational markets for Irgend
became ineviable with the globalization of the IT in-
dustry and to assrue Legend's firtrue. Dring 7W243'
about 5 percent of Legend's turnover carue from ove$eali
ruarkets, including Europe, Asia.Paciffc, and North
America.
Lr April 2003, Legend adopted a new logo and the
English brand name lrnovo. Lenovo meant innovation
and creation. The Le in the name connected with Leg'
end, while novo linked to inno'i'ation andnovelty. The
decision to create the new brand was also prompted by
the fact that other users in a number of major markets
had registered the Legend name. However, the L9'year'
old company continued to tade as Legend Group, and
nsed its Chinese trand name in combination with the
Lenovo logo in its home market"
Yang remarked.
Although our brsiness focus is still qr China
e*pandng into the intematisnai market is sr
inevitable path bi&. the globalization of the IT
indwtry and for I*gend's self.develo'pment. Having
made reference to *re sticcessfrrl e.rryerience of well-
known brands, we declded to choose a single.tnand
stnrcture to concenEete our tesourc€s on the acomu'
latisn of or,rrbrand value.6
ln March 2004, Lenovo loined the Olympic Paltner
Program of the intemational Olympic Committee,
(IOC). Lenovo was the fust Chinese company to be'
come the computer technology equipment partner of the
IOC for 2005 to 2'008. Betwesr 2004 and 2008, Lenovo
would provide computing technology eqnipment (in'
ctuding desktop compute$' notebooks, servers, artd
desktop printers) fr*di"g as well as technologicd sup'
port to the 2006 Tudn Olympic Winter Gasres, the 2008
Beijing Oilmpic Games, and over 200 natiooal Olympic
committees aronnd the world.
?One of tbe l"ading elcctronics producn companies in Chiff-
ssharon Desker Shaw, 'Bnoding: kgend Crcateo lrnovo for E:rport,n
MeliaAsia, May 15,2003, p' 10.
-9-
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TIIE IBM DEAL
In December l}}4,Lenovo arnounced it was purchasing
iBM's PC inanufacnuing br:sineso. After the successful
cornpletion of the deal, Ienovo would locate iti PCbuii'
ness-worldwide headguarters in New York, with princi'
pal operations in Beijing and Ra1eigtr, Nortfi Carolirra,
and sales offices throughout the world
Lenovo would gain ownership of DM's PC designF&
. cilities, including an R&D lab in Yamato, Japan. In ad-
dition, Lenovo would either. acquire outdght ot get
licensing righe to a large pordolio of IBM Patents. The
PC manufacturing portion of the Intemational lnforma'
tion Producu C-ompany (IIPC) tr Shenzhen, China,
which was co-owned by tsM and Great'Wdl, was in-
cluded in the iransaction. Howeyer,IIPC's IBM eSerrrer
xSeries rnanufacturing was exduded.
After the urerger' Lenovo would haye a combined an'
nud PC sales of approximately $12 billion and volurae
of 11.9 million units, based mr 2003 buslness rezults---a
for:rfotd ingease in Lenovo's PCbusiness.Ienovo's new
PC business would benefft ftmr a, powedul worldwide
distribution and sales network covering 160 connuies.
IBM would be the prefened sefirices and customer-
financing provider to Lenovo. lencnto would b"-fi" pry:
fened zupplier of PCs to IBM, whifr would offer a full
range of persorul computing solutbru to its eoterprise
and small and medium bwiness cliene.
IBM'S erdsting enterprise sales force'of approximately
30,000 pro ssiotrals and the Web site ibm,com would
provide marketing srryport and dedand generation ser-
vices for Lenovo products, some of wbich would be sold
through IBM PC specialists who would join Lenovo. IBM
Gmd financing and IBM Global'Serrtices' (the nuober
one ff senrices organization in the tvorld with powerful
existing .nt cp.is. dannels) would be preferred
prwiders to Lpaovo for leasing anri ffnancing senrices
iod f*.trr*ty and mainteaance scrrrices, respectively'
The deal, otriclrally announced oa, ftcernber 7,20041
'was 
valued 
^t$L.75 Li[ion in cash stoclg.anil aszumed,liabilities. IBM would teceive at least $650 million in
cash and up to $600 million'in lenovo GouP coTtmgJt
stock, subjlct to a lock'in period efpidng periodically
over three years. Lenovo would asqume approximately
$500 mitlion of net'balance sheet liabilities from IBid'
The 
"uh 
portion of the consideratioo would be fimded
tfuo,rgh intemal cash anddebt.
Orice the agrcelDent was frnalired in early 2005,
Lenovo would- tiave thrbe ownert--*re state etith
46 percent, publie investors with 35 percent, and IBItti
*itt fg p#tttt The Ctrinese goo"*-*t owned
57 percent of Lenovo. To be managed primarily by fot'
-.i IBM executives workirig out of Nev York, the com-
pany would have 19,000 employees, with-10,000 of them
ioming from IBM' of those 10'000'"40 percent were
based in China arrdls percent in the United States'
...rc|-
- 10-
LenovoFz0oS @ 
"""""
2004 2003
lnc6ease/ '(HK$ml WK$ml {Decrease}'
[AGU610l
EXHIBIT 1
Lenovo: Financial
Hightights
Source: Irenovo Alnual-Repon
2004.
Financial'Fosition
Total assets
Cash and cash equivalents
Shareholders' iund
Others
lnterim dividend (HK cents)
Prooosed final dividend {HK cents)
Special dividend (HK cents)
8,342
2,650
4,489
6,756
2,808
4,189
23.5o/o
(5.670)
7,2o/o
11,1Y0
N/A
2.0
t:
1R
en
5,2
27:0%
27.3o/o
Lenovo: Turnover
Analysis by Business
Segment
Source: Lcrrovo Aonual Report
2004.
Market Share of ToP 5
PC Brands in China
Sor.rrce: Lenovo A.nnual Repon
z@4.
70.79/o
7.1Vo
4.s%
0",, ffirt'tn
m 2003
B zooz
. 
',, ! r!=!E!= 
- 
EXHIBIT z
'ffi*rF.**t*mmi?![F
2.4% O.8alo
I Corporate lT business
! Consumer lT business
I Handheld device business
fl tT service business
fl Contract manufacturing business
EXHIBIT 3
ffisFJr
Founder
Tongfan$
,rrffio1'J#"
9.1Vo
...lll-
Part 5 @ *t Stlategy and Sfiucture of intemailonal Business
2004
Contribution to ,.
operating frofit:' Turngvqr
Consumer lT
t"The lBM4,.trovo Deal: Vctory for Chinal" unaur.
lnuthfue.whornn.upmn.edt, January 14' 2005.
': Turnpver
(HK$'000) ' IHK$Ooo)
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2003
Gontributiorto-
Opdlating Profit
i irtrgiooot
EXTIIEIT 4
Lenovo: Turnover and Contribution
Source: Lenovo Annual RcPoa 2004.
Lenovo hoped ro leverage IBMk powerful global
brand chrough a five'year brand liceruing agreement ari
well as throl:gh ownership of the globally recognized
"Thft*D family of trademarks. IBM'S PC business gener-
ated over $9 biilion in revenues in 2003 and offered a full
range of desktop and notebook PC systems' The acquisl
tiori would prorride Lenovo access to the worldwide PC
market and enable the company to generate armual rev-
enues of more than $12 billion.
Yang was clearly optimistic:
Lenovo of China is going to be Lenovo of the world' We
won't be sacisffed with dre number tluee position' We
will formally challenge the odrer two major competitors
in the global PC market. The top managemglt has
an"lped indep*r why there is no profit for IBy" PC
business. IBM L a service-oriented company, which
focuses on products with kgh retums' Bur the PC
business [G at a] stage where efficiency lbrings] success'
and that's why IBM's previons business model doesn't
work . . . To reach high efficiency, tlere has to be big
product scaie. IBM only focuses on the big corp.orate
"U"r,r., 
with less coverage for the middle size clients'
This [hurtsJ IBM in *re competition with rivals like
De[. Lenovo is stong wherc iBM is weak . ' ' and that is
why we are confideniabout the funue-e
According to IDC figures {ot2003, che combined unic
market share-of Lenol J and lBM's PC businesses world-
wide was approximately 8 percenl Tle Eansacdon
would dramatically strengthen Lenovo's global presence
in the fast gtowing notebook PC marletplace'
Despite the oprimism erpressed by Lig 1nd Yang, flluuly
analysts believed rhat d:e deal presentei St". uncertain'
cies, acceptance of the newlenovo by IBM's clients and rhe
PC market; retaining IBM employees; and integarion of
the sro corporate cultrres. Lenovo would have to manage
highly complicated logistics and supply ctrains, while mov'
n! forwudrn an industry witl shrinking pro{it margirs'
-Meanwhile, the proposed deal had raised conceflIs
amongU.S. politicians. In mid-January 2005, thnee Re-
publicin.or,gror*.., expressed concems that the deal
could transfeiadvanced technology and corporate assets
to the Chinese govemment, along with liceruable or
export-controlled technology, and might result in some
U.'S. govemment conffacts involving FG bging fulfilled
by th! Chinese gotemment. in the letter they stared:
Given the relatiorship between so'called "private
companies" in communist states and tlek governmenl'
we blfieue that it is manifesdy in the public interest to
extend the rime for review,lo
ffi For.llu, "l-awmakers Ask for More Scnrcinl of IBM Unit Sale"'
7,760,6;,68 466,814
547,780
6,82?,633
Gains/(lo'sses) on disposal of investment
uryni.onLne.ursj. csm, January 27, 2@5
...r2/-
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IBM: Revenue by
Classes of Products or
Servlces (dollars in
millions)
Source: IBM Anni.ral Report
z@4.
Systems and TechnologY GrouP:
Servers
.i
.Stor:5ge
' Microelectronics OEM
Technology services
Networking products
2004
.$ 12;460
' 2,898
. 2,131,
'424
.5...
:$ i 1,1+8
. 2:,949
. 
'2,142
7.25
2002
s 10,047
2,591
3,226
329
t6.
For the Year Ended December 31:
Ienwiin2oob ffi 
"."""
.'For the Year Ended
Decembir 31 : Gonsolidated
Yearto Year Yearto Year
Percent Percent ChangeChange Cgnstant CurrencY
ftNlllBlr 6
IBM:Geographic
Information
Source: IBM Annual Report
7r)n2004 2003
$ 96,293 $ 89,131 s.0v;
Responding to these concem6' the U'S. govemment
decided to .*"*io" whether the deal threatened na-
tional security interests.
Lenovo's Chinese perent company and largest share-
holder was closely tied to the CAS. The extended review
of the deal was conducted by the U.S. Tieasury Depatt'
mentt Committee on Foreign Investment in the U'S'
(CFruS), an interagency panelthat was chaired by]ohn
W. Snow. After the review (which lasted for 45 days), a
report had to be submirced to the US. president, who
would have 15 dals to announce the final decision'
In February 2}Q5,'{angclarified that the deal would
not pose a national security threat to the Uhlted States:
Probably there are more PG sold a year than TVs
throughout the rvorld. Therefore, yoy lngw q1d I know
of thJtechnology content embedded in che PG,
therefore I don't think that we will pose any securiry
threat to the U.S. Our rransaction vvill add a lot of
bEnefies not c'nly m the bilateral relationship between
the npo countries but also the comrnscial relatioruhip
betweenU.S. and Chinese companies, And I lcnow that
a lot of Chinese cornpanies are also thinking about
doing business in the U.S., and we hope that we can
proui-d. a good and successful example for them'll
He said that the deal could be 'beneficial" to Sino-
U.S. ties as mote Chinese companies sought to gf,ow
overseas, particularly in the United States'
The committee was comforted by a plan to house
Lenovo's Raleigh operations, post'acquisition, in a sep?'
rate, three-building complex. Lenovo's corporate head-
quarters with a head .ount of about 100 would move to
llHasan Jath, "Lenovo CEO: Deal with iBM Doesn'c Pose Security
Tlueat,",nrrrnu.online.wsi'com,FebnraryZ'ZCf,5' 
.I3/_
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For thE.Year.EnOed Decernber'i 3t':: tl ,:
r-t
EXIIIBIT 7
IBM: Research,
Development, and
Engineering (dollars in'
millions)
Source: IBM Annual Report
2004,
EXHIEIT 8
IBM: Empjoyees and
Related Workforce
Source: IBM Annual Report
200+.
'.. 
.'1:x:,7vo
For the Year Ended December 31: Percqntage.GhbniJes
200342
Less-than-whollV owned 19,051 18,189' 22,282
New York frorn Beijing. Finally the deal was given a
green signal by CFIUS on March 9, 2005' CFIUS did not
Ia[ for ilry limitt to be put on Lenovo's ability to sell PG
in the United Stares, allowing it to bid for govemment
and mrlitarv contrac$'
In Marcir 2005, there was news that Lenovo would
need more funds to cope with the deal- Three private eq'
uiry firms-Texas Pacific Group, Gerreral Atlandc LLC,
ani uhe Newbridge Capital LLC affiiiate of Texas Pacific
and Blum Capital Partners-seemed to be close to tak-
ing a srake in Lenovo'
-On March 30, 2005, Lenovo officially announced
that it had received a $350 million invesrment from
Texas Pacific Group, $200 million; General Atlantic
LLC, $1OO million; ancl Newbridge Capital LLC,
$50 million. Lenovo would use about $150 million to'
wards the acquGition of the PC operatioru o{ IBM and
add the remaining to its working capital.
The company would issue to the firms a total of
2.?3 million unlisted Series A cumulative converdble
preferred shares at HK$1,000 each and unli9ryd warants
ior 237.4 million shares. The firms would have abour
17.4 percentstake, aszuming full conversion of dre pre'
fened shares and exercise of the wanants, and including
the iszuance of shares to IBM in the $1'25 billion PC
unit transaction.
These new investors would give the company expert'
ise in helping it carve out the IBM PC business from its
former pareni. In addicion, they would play a role in help-
ing meige two diverse culcures. The new investorc also
would take 3 our of the 12 seats on the Lenovo board'
The new investment changed the payment tenns' '
Originally, Lenovo thought it would give IBM shares
valued at $600 million and cash of $650 million, which
it obsined th"rough bank loaru' But under the change.l
circumstances, Lenovo had decided to use $150 million
of the money from the private-equity firms.to boost its
cash payment to $800 million. It would issue shares val-
ued ai $450 *illiotr Eo IBM, whiih wouid then be left
with a 13.4 percent stake in the combined firm. The re-
maining $ZbO million from dre private-equity firms
wourld be used for working capital.
ETIE ROAD ^EITEAD
Legend's diversified business pordolio included con-
sumer and corpomte IT, handheld devices, IT services,
and contract manufacnrring br-r,sinesses:" Under the
Lenovo brand, it had also extended its product line to in-
clude mobile phones. To counter sluggish domestic sales,
the company had shifted its custometfocus to companies
where it was likely to be able to charge a premium. How-
ever, Liu stressed that Legend's matketing activities
would continue co be focused on rhe consumer market'
China, which accounted for 42 prcent of PC ship-
ments in the Asia.Pacific region excluding Japan in
2003, grew at ?.8 percent in the fouth quarter of 70QZ
and it was expected to continue to drive regional expan-
sion in 2003.12 Legend posted double-digit Percentage
gairu year-on-year. HP retained irc second spot in the re-
lion wirh a relatively srna11 growth rate, while IBM,
which stood at the *rird place, reported positive year-on-
year gairu. Dell, placed fourch, similatly posted year-oll-
year gains in most countries.
' 
Although Lenovo faced increased, competition, the
multinational brands continued to lag behind. indeed,
Ford-rng ,o toc.
...r4t-
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Lenovo's Z? percent market share overshadowed both
il 
"odfor.ign 
competitots-Dell and IBM, and HP
"i-: f"."uo.. Even .Founder lagged 
far behind at
9.4 percent.- 
6[o*ittg the succes#ul deal with IB$, both Lenovo
*i rijpt *J"U profic from Lenovo's access to dfrrerging
Asian markets.
Liu commented:
In the past'three years we set uP 1r-oad map to achieve
diversiiication. However, things did not go well with
o* pUfl. \il(fe were roo anr<ious co achieve our€oals' 
-
*" iia io. Oiot tttougtt our plans clearly, and we did
not zucceed. As a resulc, for the no<t three years we
have devcloped a new strategy' !7e will focus on the
PC industryiirsl Of course, this is just athree-year
plan-Wb do t ot intend to focrs just on PCs fo-rever'
ft.-are'"o* 
"o*ing 
on plans foiglobal'izationas well
o 
""* 
ways of diveisificatlon, but we haven't reached
any conclusion yet.!
How the IBM/Ienovo deal would play out temained
to i" ,..rr. To make rhe deal work, Lenovo had decided
ro put IBM's executives in charge. Stephen M' Ward, Jr''
cuiently IBM senior vice president and sfneral manag-er
oi ig\a'; Pemonal Systerns ctoup, would.serve as the
CEO of L"oovo,.and'Yang would serqe as the chairman'
Ho*.u"t, Liu,'who ** * extraordiriarily capable per'
son and well versed in dealing with the Chinese govem'
" 
."i *.tfa step aside tt 
"h"it * and not be 
part of
the new management teafii.
Meanwhilelthe average age of Lenovo employees was
below 30, while IBM executives v/ere older and more
seasoned. Lenovo would have to blend executives who
could manage the Chinese government and maintain a
strong 
"ompltitiu" 
position in the United States' Would
Lenovo be able to meet these challenges?
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